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Personification in Three Legal Cultures:
The Case of the Conception of the
Corporate Unit
Gregory A. Mark*
Do ideas matter? Does history matter? Does the history of ideas matter?
Ron Harris presents us with a paper that engages all three of these questions.
Addressing a paper that deals with questions of such magnitude requires taking
seriously the intellectual plane on which they are presented, while
simultaneously avoiding becoming ensnared in the question of the legitimacy of
such meta-questions. To engage the paper then, we must ask a seemingly
simple set of questions about influence-why would (or, of course, why
wouldn't) ideas, history, or, most appropriately, the history of ideas, have
influence?
Harris begins with the assumption that ideas have consequences. His
paper, unsurprisingly, requires us to refine that assumption considerably.
Looming above all other refinements is the issue of proportion: Do meta-ideas
necessarily have meta-consequences? Do mid-level ideas necessarily have midlevel consequences?' In Harris's case the meta- and mid-level ideas grow out
of the seemingly political problem of intermediary associations, that is, the
organized bodies that lie between the individual and the ultimate authority.
The political problem is not a necessary problem of existence, of course, but a
problem of intellect. In this case, it is the relentless logic of authority and
power expanding until it is all-encompassing, tolerating no other organized
* Justice Nathan Jacobs Scholar, Professor of Law, Associate Dean, Director of the
Center on Institutional Governance, Member of the Graduate Faculty in History, Rutgers
University School of Law. J.D., University of Chicago; B.A., Butler University.
1. Pessimists, or at least the cautious, might well suggest that we may easily be misled by
the appearance of words masquerading as ideas, especially ones purporting to have
consequences. In any conference dealing with the modem corporation, such as this one, such
caution could be quite instructive, and examples warranting such caution abound. For instance,
nearly all modem corporations have mission statements. Despite their high tone and solemnity,
and to the extent they are even remembered, one might ask whether those statements have any
consequences whatsoever, much less intellectual influence. When being nakedly truthful with
themselves, breathes there a lawyer or executive who, when faced with a difficult decision (or
any decision, for that matter), turns to the corporate mission statement for inspiration, for
insight, or for guidance? If not, how should we understand the purported significance of such
words?
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body that might claim the allegiance, however partial, of the individual. Now,
this problem is one of the intellect, and not a necessary problem of existence,
because intermediary associations have always existed, and were certainly
antecedent to the modem state.2
The relentless logic of authority-the nature of sovereignty-is one that
has long bewitched theoreticians and historians. Harris does not tackle the
entire issue, but does take on one very powerful aspect of the intellectual
problem: the evolution of the idea of personification of entities in nineteenth
and twentieth century Germany, England, and the United States.
Personification is, simply put, conceptualizing an organized body of individuals
as a person, a legal person, or a legal entity, so that it might be treated at law as
if it were an individual rather than an amalgamation of individuals akin to the
sovereign state.3 This paper, then, is a kind of intellectual history. Harris tells
three stories whose content is delimited by geography, argues that the stories
are interwoven, and seeks to spell out the connections among them. The stories
are intellectual history in the sense that he is concerned centrally with the ideas
themselves, rather than their impact on the social, political, or economic milieu
in which they operated. He does not attempt to assess, for example, whether
personification increased the efficiency of an economic organization, the
transparency or responsiveness of a civic body, or the power of any association.
His method is not unlike an older school of literary criticism that sought to
discover how one author or school influenced or begot another. Moreover,
given that so few authors are involved in thinking about personification, the
stories, especially to the extent that they are interwoven, take on a
prosopographical quality. What Harris does, and does magnificently, is trace
the timing of intellectual events. Having worked in the American sources for
many years, I have wondered which theorist outside of the United States made
which point and who might have been aware of such authorship. Harris
provides such nuggets, suggesting in many cases the reasons why an insight
was well-received by other theorists. Even if one puts aside for the moment the
intractable difficulties of causation, such juxtapositions have a compelling
quality.

2. That the intellectual problem becomes a real problem as institutions assert power is
obvious, but the mere assertion of power is different from the assertion-as the logic of
authority suggests--of complete authority. The former is a problem of politics, the latter a
problem of intellect and the legitimacy of the intermediary association.
3. The state, too, may be personified, but that aspect of personification presents
somewhat different difficulties, especially anthropomorphic, than the personification of
intermediate associations.
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What level of idea is it that he traces through the alleys of western
thought? If culture is a meta-idea, similar to authority or sovereignty, then
personification is a mid-level idea. It derives meaning from larger concepts,
but it has its own consequences. It assists us, and assisted generations past, in
thinking productively and imaginatively about intermediary associations; it can
also seduce us into unconscious anthropomorphism. Harris seeks to unpack
just how we have been assisted (or not) by asking about the consequences in a
very concise and particular manner. Do concepts of the organization of human
activity make a difference? Specifically, do they help legitimate such organized
activity? Most particularly, for whom do such concepts assist in legitimation
and why? Do such concepts assist in understanding the differentiation among
cultures in the nature of such organized activity? Do they make a difference in
the nature of the organized activity? Does a theory of personification explain or
express a culture's unique qualities in its organized activity?
Harris's answer is that personification does make a difference, but perhaps
not in all those ways. One way to conceive of these influences and differences
is by way of analogy. Think of intellectual terroir. Terroir is a French
oenological term. To the believers, it is a fundamental tenet of fine wine
making that great wine is an expression of the unique qualities of soil and
culture in a given area right down to, for example, the micro-plots that
characterize legendary Burgundian vineyards. To skeptics, it is at best a notion
or a cultural affectation that enervates creativity, calcifying both thought and
practice. There is, of course, much to the notion that soil and location affect
what a wine tastes like. The cabemets of Bordeaux are of variegated
appearance and taste and yet are still different from the cabernets of Napa
Valley. And so on. The wines appear and taste different unless knowledgeable
and talented vintners deliberately try to mimic each other's style, or try to cater
to a particular perception of market desire. They then become terrifically
difficult to identify by location. What then to make of terroir? So with ideas.
So with personification.
Harris begins with Germany. From German thinkers came, at least in its
modem form, the concept of personification.4 It was but one example of
thought that grew from the intellectual battles going on in nineteenth century
law and philosophy. One interesting question is why the flow of ideas appears
to have been unidirectional. Harris notes, but bypasses, this question. As he
writes:
4. See Ron Harris, The Transplantation of the Legal Discourse on Corporate
PersonalityTheories: From German Codification to British PoliticalPluralismandAmerican
Big Business, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1421, 1427-1430 (2006) (providing a thorough and
complete discussion of corporate personification and its roots in German thought).

1482

63 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1479 (2006)
While every intellectual relationship is likely to be reciprocal, my interest is
in the flows of influences from Germany to Britain and the United States.
This was the main direction of flow of ideas in this specific discourse
because the discourse originated in Germany, which was at that time at the
zenith of its legal-intellectual prestige. A study of the import of AngloAmerican influences to Germany is beyond the scope of the present
project.'

Although Harris eschews an explicit answer,6 the intellectual question remains.
Why were the British and American scholars the ones attuned to German
developments, and not the other way around? Or why was the interest not
mutual? Nonetheless, and notwithstanding his disavowal that he might explore
the reciprocal nature of jurisprudential discourse, he says little about why
British and American legal culture do not penetrate German discourse. 7 The
speculation whets our appetites. Allow me to speculate. England and the
United States absorbed German ideas. Germany-more precisely, German
academics and jurists-sought no insight from Anglo-American legal culture,
or at least we are told of no such intellectual expeditions. Even at the
humorously vulgar level, there were no actual expeditions. Why is it, for
example, that we learn of English academics and jurists making the grand tour
of the United States, but few if any similarjoumeys by German academics and
jurists? It is misleading to conceive of the academic influence as anything but
uni-directional, at least on the evidence we have.
An explanation might lie in the culture of the various academic and
juridical communities, especially an explanation that posits a kind of fellowship
(genossenscaft) to explain German intellectual insularity. If,however, German
juridical ideas were well-received, they were selectively well-received.
Personification may have traveled well; genossenscaft did not. The idea of
personification also grew differently in different juridical cultures-different
terroirs-asHarris is at pains to explain. In Germany personification was
explanatory of political culture.8 What would be interesting, however, would
not be simply to explore the different ways the personified entity manifested
itself most powerfully in these different cultures, but also to compare the
vehicles across cultures. In the United States, for example, the personified
5. Id. at 1425 (citing Mark H. Hager, Bodies Politics: The ProgressiveHistory of
Organizational"RealEntity" Theory, 50 U. PiTT. L. REv. 575, 580 (1989)).
6. In delivering this paper Harris suggested that the discourse "bridged" the legal
cultures. He has pulled back from that metaphor, perhaps in response to the discussion that the
bridge metaphor suggested too much.
7. See Harris, supra note 4, at 1437 (discussing how Gierke saw the Anglo-American
culture not as a threat, but as a source of inspiration).
8. See id. at 1437-40 (explaining the German roots of personification).
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business corporation leads as the example of the personified entity, whereas in
Germany its main utility came in political theory. Why were business entities
not similarly personified in Germany, which, after all, arguably began its
Industrial Revolution before or at least contemporaneously with the United
States? Or were they? Were German business corporations relatively-by
comparison with American corporations-autonomous? Were they genuinely
private? Does the German manifestation of personification in political theory
suggest that business corporations were not conceived of as a threat to the state,
that is, the personified state? In this most theoretically conscious of juridical
communities, why not? (All the more so because, as business historians remind
us, German businesses remained family owned or controlled into the twentieth
and, in many instances, the twenty-first centuries. Familial interests have been,
of course, at the core of political intrigue forever.)
In England, by contrast, personification had immediate traction. 9
Consciously deployed not by the historian and incidental translator (Maitland)
of the greatest German theorist (Gierke), but by his "disciples,"'1°
personification was a strategy designed to create some room between the state
and the individual for collective behavior, especially collective behavior by
laborers in the face of the collective behavior of capitalists. These disciples
hoped that personification could protect organized labor, especially in
confrontations with organized capital, without resort to the ultimate authority of
the state." In England, then, the key question is personification's legitimating
function for association when trying to understand the view of sovereignty
prevalent (and pervasive) in English political thought. Little imagination would
have been required-none really, a backwards glance across the Channel was
all that was necessary-for a concerned member of the English elite to be
alarmed at the prospect of legitimated organized labor. Here was an entity that
might actually-though such thoughts were usually spoken softly, and only
occasionally coming out as political calls to arms-threaten the aims of the
sovereign. Thus, I believe Harris is exactly right in his understanding of the
back and forth rhetoric of personification in Taff Vale Railway Co. v.
12
Amalgamated
Society
of Railway
Servants.
Claims for
the aimportance
of
juridical rhetoric,
however,
need more
than one example,
albeit
powerful one,

9. See id. at 1440-42 (explaining personification in the English context).
10. See id.
at 1441 ("[I]n the context of political theory we should focus our attention on
Maitland's disciples and not on him.").
11. See id.at 1446 (discussing how the disciples hoped to build on the cultural

occurrences).
12. Taff Vale Ry. Co. v. Amalgamated Soc'y of Ry. Servants, [ 1901 ] 1 A.C. 426; see
Harris, supra note 4 at 1446-50 (providing an extensive discussion of Taff Vale Railway).
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before we should take as a given that the rhetoric has grounded a way of
thinking. Before accepting Harris's full claim, then, English juridical discourse
would need to have moved beyond Maitland, beyond his disciples, and
influenced discourse more generally. While interesting, Harris's chief example
of how the personification rhetoric entered the English juridical mainstream
comes in a curious way. He cites Louis Brandeis, who discusses Taff Vale in
the context of American law in a debate with Samuel Gompers on the law and
legal concept of trade unions in the United States.' 3 I have my doubts that a
reference to a single case by an American jurist establishes that English
jurisprudence took personification as the theoretical basis for the legitimacy of
associations or of "real entity" theory.' 4 Ubiquity, not prominence, establishes
influence. One might as easily read the importance of Taff Vale somewhat
differently. It could just as easily be said to be a prominent case with a
powerful political content in search of a rationale. The legacy of the case, not
its prominence, should be the basis on which the importance of personification
rests.15
The westward movement of theory took personification across the Atlantic
to the United States where it flourished. Given some of the criticism that has
been leveled at my own work on personification of the business corporation in
the United States, I really ought to be a great cheerleader for Harris's work.
That criticism, however, leaves me with some questions about my own claims
for the influence and importance of personification, even simply among
lawyers, forgetting for a moment whether it made a difference in the actual
growth and treatment of business. Let me make a few simple points that, while
not addressing the issues of movement of ideas that are at the core of Harris's
work, do get at the larger question of whether the ideas had consequences.

13. See Harris, supra note 4, at 1451-52 (presenting the famous debate between Louis
Brandeis and Samuel Gompers over the corporate status of trade unions).
14. See id. at 1447 (stating that "[t]his is a clear adoption of real entity theory").
15. The question of influence beyond a single case becomes all the more acute in the
English context given Harris's rather broad assertion of the anti-theoretical bent of the English
bar. In discussing a different understanding of personification, the grant theory, or "artificial
entity" theory, Harris suggests that it survived the free incorporation of business entities for no
better reason than "because most English lawyers did not care much about legal theories and
believed that whatever new problems arose in the world of free incorporation could be dealt
with successfully using conventional doctrinal legal tools." Id. at 1464. Why theory should be
useful-that is, legitimating-in one context and not useful in the other seems to require a more
detailed explanation than simply asserting the prominence of juridical pragmatism in one era
and then suggesting its efflorescence in the one that followed, when the only thing that changed
was the appearance of Maitland-who did not use personification, at least according to Harris,
instrumentally-and his disciples.
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First, and unique to the United States, is federalism. No other country of
industrial or commercial importance in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries had a federal structure, or at least, none with anything close to the
robust structure of the United States. Notwithstanding the Civil War and the
triumph of the national government over the breakaway states, American
federalism helped to legitimate intermediary institutions in this country, even in
its political discourse and culture, in ways unknown elsewhere, even in
Germany. What the experience of that war suggested was that even an
intermediate institution of great strength and actual political power, one which
in fact commanded the loyalty of individuals-an American state-did not
ultimately undermine the legitimacy of centralized authority, the national state.
If, even in triumph, the national state allowed the continued existence of the
American states, then the existence of private entities could hardly be seen as
presenting a challenge to the national state of nearly the same magnitude. The
question of the challenge to sovereignty posed by private entities simply got
bypassed.
Second, on a historiographical and not a grand level, Naomi Lamoreaux,
an economic historian at UCLA, in an as yet unpublished work, has suggested
that the debates about the meaning of personification of the corporation do not
match up well with the actual rise of big business, at least insofar as big
business is equated with dispersed shareholding. (That meaning is key because
the personified corporation that is real, or natural, like the unions of laborers in
England championed by Maitland's followers, depends on seeing human
organization as a product not of forces of the state-the grant theory-but as a
product of the collective desire of a group to take action that as individuals
would be impossible.) Thus, whatever the effect on each other, the
intellectuals-the jurists and the academics who participated in the debatesappear to have had little influence on the work-a-day world.
While the timing may be off, influence may be manifest in other ways.
For example, one theory may have greater explanatory power than another,
illuminating the problems of organized entities in a manner that leads to more
cogent understandings and, therefore, development. With organized entities,
autonomy was only one aspect of the implications of different theoretical
constructs. Another was governance. Ernst Freund's work is about nothing but
the nature of hierarchy and order within the corporation, anticipating the classic
Berle and Means discussion of the separation of ownership and control by
several decades. It is a powerful extension of the real or natural entity school
and involves an author who was educated in Germany and made his intellectual
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home in the United States.' 6 Moreover, the implications of the work are not
limited to the business corporation, so it ought to fit better into Harris's
capacious understanding of personified entities.
This is a paper much to be admired for its ambition. Its learning is
prodigious and very suggestive. Nonetheless, the very large questions it seeks
to address, both directly and by implication, require a bit more. What do we
learn from the literary notion of influence? We learn who communicated with
whom, and sometimes we learn why. We learn, by way of debates, what the
intellectual players thought was important. But a compelling distinction exists
between literary analysis of influence and its application outside literature. In
literature the story is the end in itself, an ultimate aesthetic expression. This is
not so, or at least rarely so, in law or philosophy. Law, especially, is an
institution that expresses power. Harris recognizes this distinction between his
method of inquiry and the nature of influence. But to do real justice to the
topic, beyond the excellent and provocative, but ultimately speculative,
beginnings embodied in this work, he needs to examine the institutions the
theory(ies) of personification hope to explain or illuminate. For example, if, as
Harris suggests, personification had a greater role in Germany than in England
or the United States in explaining or illuminating the culture of the state, we
ought to have some suggestions about why that might be. If, as I earlier
suggested, the theory had implications for explaining the autonomy of the
business corporation in the United States, then we ought to have some kind of
explanation about the role it played in Germany (really, the German states),
since the growth of industrial and commercial enterprises occurred at roughly
the same time in both areas. Again, Harris understands the issue-he attempts
exactly such a comparative approach in dealing with the status of labor unions
in England and the United States.17 In this paper he has identified several
institutions in individual countries-the state, labor unions, and corporationsfor which personification has served to enhance legal legitimacy. That list
could, and should, be added to, and then it should be studied comparatively.
16. Harris recognizes, in one section of his paper, Freund's contribution, but dismisses
him as a "relatively marginal figure, practically a new immigrant, holding a position outside a
law school and in a minor university." Id.at 1435. This assessment strikes me as curious in
several ways. Granting a pretty wide range to the meaning of "marginal," Freund nonetheless
held degrees from prestigious institutions, was able to secure an American appointment, and
while the University of Chicago might well have been a fledgling place, since inception it has
been an important American university and recognized as such. Moreover, it was precisely the
law school's willingness to allow him to teach that precipitated the rancorous split between its
faculty and that of Harvard Law School, who had lent a faculty member to be dean.
17. See id. at 1446-56 (providing a comparative approach in discussing labor unions in
England and the United States).
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The church, of course, heads the list, along with educational institutions, for
which autonomy and self-governance have been issues which antedated the
liberal state. Charitable institutions, political parties, clubs, and even sports
teams are other examples.
Harris has tapped a rich vein. His approach is one that has several virtues,
the least of which is tracing the story of influence. That story has rich meaning
for the sociology of knowledge, something he hints at but is too modest to
claim. This story of influence suggests not just that ideas might have
consequences, but that their development is a much more layered and richly
textured process than has heretofore been assumed by many, really most,
scholars who have examined the development of legal thought and institutions
within a single political culture. Personification has such a history and we
should be profoundly grateful to Ron Harris for having taken an important step
to explain just how a concept such as institutional personification can have
trans-cultural meaning that might be embodied in explanations of disparate
entities. It would be churlish to complain that the work is incomplete. Better to
applaud the scholar whose imagination first ventures down the line of inquiry
with such promise.

